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Disads are Non-unique- Obama has curbed presidential power on drones but won’t ban them

Nelson 9/5 (Updated September 5, 2013, 8:58 p.m. ET Obama's Curbs on Executive Power Draw Fire By COLLEEN MCCAIN NELSON White House correspondent for The Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323893004579057463262293446.html) Dabo

President Barack Obama, who pledged to push his second-term domestic agenda through executive actions when Congress wouldn't cooperate, has moved in the opposite direction on international affairs in recent months as he created new checks on executive authority. By asking Congress to authorize military action against Syria, proposing some constraints on National Security Agency surveillance programs and placing limits on drone strikes, the president voluntarily has ceded some authority in foreign policy and national security, legal experts say.The president's moves on national-security issues reflect a mix of political pragmatism as well as personal principles, and exactly how much power Mr. Obama actually has given up is the subject of debate. He has walked a fine line on Syria, for example, saying he wasn't required to seek sign-off from lawmakers for a military strike but asking for their approval anyway.A senior administration official said that while the new drone-strike policy does rein in executive authority, the NSA and Syria proposals weren't a reduction of power but an effort to increase transparency and build public confidence.Still, the president, who was criticized for seizing too much power through recess appointments and other steps that some said circumvented Congress, now is being criticized by veterans of past Republican administrations for weakening the presidency. John Yoo, a Justice Department official in the George W. Bush administration, said Mr. Obama had unnecessarily limited his own authority. He noted that it is rare to see a president restrict his powers.Mr. Obama "has been trying to reduce the discretion of the president when it comes to national security and foreign affairs," said Mr. Yoo, now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley. "These proposals that President Obama is making really run counter to why we have a president and a constitution."Others, though, said the president had given up a modicum of authority in an effort to protect presidential power and guard against congressional action.The question of the extent of executive power has been long debated in Washington. President Lyndon Johnson was accused of using a narrow congressional resolution to vastly and illegally expand the Vietnam War, for example, and President Richard Nixon was accused of creating an "imperial presidency" before his resignation.More recently, Mr. Obama's predecessor, Mr. Bush, was accused by Democrats of having inappropriately expanded executive powers in combating terrorism. Jack Quinn, who served as White House counsel for President Bill Clinton, said Mr. Obama's recent moves amount to threading a needle to reach agreements and avoid larger setbacks for executive power. "Sometimes, it's important to show tolerance for others in order to preserve the power that you have," he said. "I don't think anyone can say that he is a shrinking violet when it comes to his use of power as president." A.B. Culvahouse, White House counsel under Ronald Reagan, agreed that the president imposing constraints on executive authority is the preferable course if it helps dissuade Congress from stepping in to impose the same or more onerous limitations. Lawmakers retain the power of the purse, he noted, and also could codify restrictions in statute.This summer, Mr. Obama faced intensifying criticism of NSA surveillance programs and a growing chorus urging him to consult with Congress on Syria. Still, Mr. Culvahouse questioned the president's decision to voluntarily impose new rules limiting drone strikes, saying he thought that was a mistake. "These self-imposed limitations hang around, and it's hard to undo some of these things," he said.Mr. Obama had faced criticism for expanding the drone program launched by Mr. Bush. In May, he imposed new restrictions on drone strikes, establishing that Americans must be directly threatened and saying there must be near-certainty that no civilians would be killed. Last month, he proposed several NSA reforms, calling for a revamp of part of the Patriot Act and changes to the secret Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court.While conventional wisdom suggests that second-term presidents are emboldened to exercise their power, in part because they will not run again for re-election, Mr. Obama has shown an inclination to compromise on some issues. He has spoken about his willingness to act without Congress on domestic issues—particularly gun control and climate change—even as he has sought lawmakers' approval on national-security questions.The president's allies say this is a principled stand, consistent with his campaign promises to be transparent and uphold the Constitution.Andrew Rudalevige, a professor of government at Bowdoin College, said a mix of factors, including political pressure and consideration of the presidential legacy, likely factored into the administration's thinking on such issues."Everything presidents do is political," he said. "Presidents really do care about their legacy. He does not want to be seen as someone who overrode the Constitution as someone who taught constitutional law."In public comments, the president has underscored his belief that he doesn't need Congress's authorization to act against Syria. A senior administration official said working with lawmakers was meant to send a stronger message to the world, not to limit presidential power.The new drone policy, though, reflected the administration's view that the threat of terrorism could be confronted without using executive authority as aggressively as in the past—a message the president delivered in a speech in May.

# Plan

#### Thus the Plan- The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its statutory restrictions on Presidential War Power authority by restricting targeting killing by banning strikes through pilotless aerial vehicles

## Adv 1. The next Vietnam

#### Current drone operations are being shifted to Africa

Wolverton 7/30 (Tuesday, 30 July 2013 09:55 President Obama Sending Drones All Around the Globe Written by Joe Wolverton, II, J.D. Joe A. Wolverton, II, J.D. is a correspondent for The New American and travels frequently nationwide speaking on topics of nullification, the NDAA, and the surveillance state. http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/16125-pres-obama-sending-drones-all-around-the-globe) (We do not support the gendered language in this card) Dabo

The “next phase of drone warfare” will extend “far beyond traditional, declared combat zones," the Washington Post reports. Africa, according to the report filed July 20, will see an enormous increase in the sorties of unmanned aerial vehicles remotely piloted by U.S. airmen. The commander of U.S. forces in Africa has purportedly requested a “15-fold increase in surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering on the continent.” Drone bases are going up all over Africa, so the multiplicity of missions will be easily accommodated. As the Post points out: In Africa, the U.S. Air Force began flying unarmed drones over the Sahara five months ago to track al-Qaeda fighters and rebels in northern Mali. The Pentagon has also set up drone bases in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Seychelles.

**2 Internal links**

### Somalia

#### And Drone policies in Africa and Somalia risk backlash and escalation of conflict

West 10/3 (Blurred Lines of Terrorism: Is Africa the New Afghanistan or Is America Just Overstepping? BY CARLY WEST OCTOBER 3, 2013 http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2013/10/blurred-lines-of-terrorism-is-africa-the-new-afghanistan-or-is-america-just-overstepping/) Dabo

American drones, special operations, and proxy soldiers have quietly but rapidly become commonplace in Africa in the past decade. As al-Qaeda’s central headquarters in Pakistan has been degraded into a diffused network of local terror enclaves, Africa has seen the rise of violent extremism and a surge of bloody attacks. The growing security threat from Islamic militants throughout Africa has been paralleled by increased U.S. involvement with local government forces on matters of regional security. Though the threat posed by terrorist organizations in Africa clearly demands a defense strategy, the situation may be exacerbated should the U.S. continue to implement its current approach. Instances of terrorist activity include mass hostage-taking in Algeria and routine killings of civilians in Nigeria, as well as frequent attacks in Mali, Niger, and Kenya. Just last week, during a siege of the top-end Westgate mall in Nairobi, 72 shoppers were massacred by militants from the Somalia-based al-Shabaab group. The U.S. has forged relations with these nations since 9/11, creating various alliances and establishing a physical presence through bases. In response to the recent events in Somalia, Western investigators, including a large F.B.I. contingent, have poured into Kenya to gather intelligence in an effort to help prevent further attacks by the Shabaab.The justification behind this growing military and intelligence surveillance presence, in the words of former U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General Carter Ham, is “The absolute imperative for the United States military to protect America, Americans and American interests; in our case, in my case, [to] protect us from threats that may emerge from the African continent.” Though there have been instances of successful cooperative efforts between African and American forces, America’s attempt to conduct a proxy War on Terror in Africa is inherently problematic.The security threat posed by African jihadists should be countered with a commensurate strategy, which is tailored to the severity and nature of these groups. Audrey Kurth Cronin, a national security scholar, notes that “Overreacting and treating a terrorist campaign as though it were part of a traditional military campaign in which the application of brute force would compel the enemy into submission” was the crucial mistake the United States made after 9/11. Such a concern should be considered when both U.S. and regional forces in Africa are trying to counter threats.The efforts must be conscious of the localized circumstances. After all, Africa is not Afghanistan — and its dangerous to broadly cross-reference the situation. One nation, in Africa’s circumstances, should not directly inform actions in another as part of some “trans-continental diagnoses and prescriptions.” United States will do grave harm to its interests and its ability to help foster development in the region by treating Africa as one unit of assessment. Though the UN has described Africa as fertile “breeding grounds” for terrorism, various academics and scholars display evidence that violent Islamist groups operate within the local and national contexts of their origins, and are often not operating towards a regional or globally coordinated jihad. The origin and incentive of Jihad waged against the Western world has largely stemmed from a history of foreign occupation and perceived humiliation and exclusion, coupled by the pull of charismatic leaders, rather than general poverty and poor governance. The U.S. must also evaluate how military operations will further destabilize nations in Africa and exacerbate the current situation. U.S. drone strike policy, for example, could have seriously harmful implications down the road. Not only do drone strikes inevitably cause collateral damage and engender local animosity, they can hinder future efforts at humanitarian and development missions for other Western actors. For instance, in 2008, drone strikes in Somalia prompted al-Shabaab to target and kill 35 aid workers trying to provide food aid for more than 3 million people. As a result, aid operations were significantly curtailed, deepening a humanitarian crisis that ultimately became a full-fledged famine in 2011. Another egregious instance of U.S. policy undermining its own efforts is the CIA’s use of a childhood vaccination campaign as cover for intelligence gathering against Osama bin Laden. This incident led to tragic consequences for public health, as the distrust towards America rendered millions of infants victim to preventable disease. Violent extremist organizations should be countered, but terrorism cannot be the only, or even primary, lens through which the United States attempts to quell the threat.In the long run, the only real antidote to terrorism in Africa is stable, inclusive, accountable states responsive to the needs of all their citizens, and U.S. interests would be better served by focusing efforts on state building. A collaborative mission towards stability and growth is a long-term endeavor, but one that will be set back by a few short years of U.S. military operations and on-the-ground joint exercises focused solely on counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. Killing every Islamic extremist in Africa is not possible, and irresponsible American efforts to do so will only generate more threats. As was so eloquently put by CGD policy fellow Kate Knopf, as “Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, let’s not make Africa a receptacle for the U.S. military’s leftovers — equipment, manpower, doctrine — and assess its security challenges and needs in its own light.”

### Mali

#### And Drones increase Malian instability, and refugees to neighboring countries

Simanowitz 12 (Intervening in Northern Mali: "The People are like Straw on which Elephants are Fighting" How might military action in northern Mali unfold and what impact will it have on the local population? ARTICLE | 14 NOVEMBER 2012 - 3:37PM | BY STEFAN SIMANOWITZ e has written for, among others, the Guardian (UK), the Independent (UK), the Huffington Post, the Africa Report, Al Jazeera, and the Mail and Guardian (South Africa) http://thinkafricapress.com/mali/citizens-have-nothing-their-eyes-cry-with) Dabo

Aerial reconnaissance and targeted drone strikes might have been effective a year ago when Islamist fighters were holed-up in the desert or camped in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. But now they have moved into the villages, towns and cities across their region. And their number has reportedly been swelled due to the arrival of foreign fighters, recruitment of economically impoverished locals and the forced recruitment of children. “Every day they are picking up 10 and 11-year-old children,” a resident of Timbuktu who wished to remain anonymous told a source over the phone last week. While it is true that the local population has little sympathy for the Islamist militants and are keen to be rid of them, they will not welcome military intervention which could destroy their homes and kill their children. On November 11, an emergency summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in Abuja and agreed to send around 3,000 troops to Mali. With ECOWAS, the African Union and other partner countries finalising their plans for military action to be approved by the UN Security Council later this month, one might expect an increasing number of Malians to join the exodus that has seen over 300,000 flee to refugee camps in neighbouring countries. But while some locals are still leaving, reports suggest that others are returning home. Time magazine recently reported that “buses to the north are now packed, filled with refugees no longer willing to wait out the now quiet conflict far from home”. Speaking from Mbera refugee camp in Mauritania, one refugee told Think Africa Press through a source that poor conditions had persuaded 30 people to return to his village of Tin-Gnéré near Timbuktu. “Others will follow,” he said. Military commitment and logistics Once approved by the United Nations, military action could begin immediately, although mobilisation is unlikely to be ready before early 2013. In the meantime, the militants will have time to strengthen and consolidate their positions both in the desert and in towns where they have been quick to set up semi-functioning forms of administration and service provision. Aware that they would be vulnerable to drone and aircraft attack in the open desert, the militias are likely to try to stay in the cities, towns and villages, dispersing their fighters, heavy weapons and ammunition stockpiles in anticipation of air strikes and even planting anti-personnel mines. Such an enemy will present a challenge for the military force tasked with routing them from the region. The force is expected to consist of ECOWAS and Malian soldiers, few of whom have experience of desert fighting. Serious questions have been raised over the capacity and discipline of the Nigerian army, who will form the backbone of the 3,300-strong ECOWAS fighting force. Meanwhile the weaknesses of the Malian army were sorely exposed by the uprising in the north and the coup in Bamako last March. And the arms embargo imposed by ECOWAS on Mali since the coup has weakened the demoralised Malian army still further. Whilst equipment, intelligence, training and support from American, British and French special forces will add steel to the operation, it will nevertheless involve difficult desert fighting conditions against a well-armed enemy capable of defending cities and launching counter attacks from the desert.

#### And Mali instability and refugees create a flash point for conflict in West Africa

**Naij 13** (Mali Refugee Flood Threatens to Destabilize Region 3 February, 2013 http://news.naij.com/22296.html Politics) Dabo

Blocked roads, empty markets, no electricity, no telephones. The warzone in Mali is completely cut off from the outside world. Any chance of help can only come from the South, or from neighboring countries. In November 2012, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) spoke of a "forgotten crisis." More than 400,000 people in Mali were fleeing even then. Around half of them sought shelter within the country, while the other half had already crossed the borders to neighboring nations like Mauretania, Niger, and Burkina Faso. But the story did not make the news. The world's media was concerned with other conflict zones at the time, and the humanitarian crisis in one of the world's poorest countries hardly registered. Center stage That all changed with France's military deployment in Mali earlier this month. "Since the military intervention by the French forces on January 11, about 18,000 refugees have fled Mali," said UNHCR spokesman William Spindler, who has been observing the situation from the Malian capital Bamako for a week. But UN workers are not allowed to travel freely in the country - in the past few days, they have finally been allowed into the towns of Segou and Mopti, north of the capital, but northern Mali remains out of bounds.Spindler says the crisis could spread to neighboring countries "The situation in the north of Mali is critical," said Spindler. "There is not enough food for people. We have heard that the markets are empty, because the roads have been cut by the conflict. And the border with Algeria, from where some of the products come, is closed.So markets have been looted, electricity services have been disrupted, there is no public transport, and telephone lines have also been cut." Refugees who make it to southern Mali might have reached safety, but their situation is still dire. There are no central camps for them to stay in - the refugees simply scatter across Bamako, looking for shelter with relatives, or they sleep inside mosques.

#### And African conflict will draw in outside powers and escalate to nuclear war

Deutsch 02 (Founder of Rabid Tiger Project (Political Risk Consulting and Research Firm focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe) [Jeffrey, “SETTING THE STAGE FOR WORLD WAR III,” Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Nov 18, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html]) Dabo

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. **Civil wars** in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, **and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars** (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) **turn into a really nasty stew**. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. **Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range**. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. **Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly**. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. **But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration**, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

## Adv. 2 Colonialism

#### **The French invasion of Mali is an archetype of colonialist violence that the Western world justifies in humanitarian missions. As the US gives France drones to protect its resources, it proves that the third world is nothing more than exploitable resources.**

Batou 13 (Mali: A Neo-Colonial Operation Disguised as an Anti-Terrorist Intervention\* Jean Batou is a professor of Contemporary International History at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland Summer 2013 Vol:XIV-3 Whole #: 55 Translated by Dan La Botz http://newpol.org/content/mali-neo-colonial-operation-disguised-anti-terrorist-intervention) Dabo

In mid-January of this year France invaded Mali, a former French colony that sits in the middle of what was once the enormous French empire in Africa that stretched from Algeria to the Congo and from the Ivory Coast to the Sudan. The French government argued that its invasion of its former colony was an anti-terrorist and humanitarian intervention to prevent radical Salafist Muslims from taking the capital of Bamako and succeeding in taking control of the country. Critics have suggested that France had other motivations, above all maintaining its powerful influence in the region in order to prevent European competitors, the United States, or the Chinese from muscling in, but also because of its specific interests in resources such as uranium. The situation is very complex, in part because of a historic division and even antagonism between the Tuaregs, a Berber people in the North of Mali, and the black African population in the South, but also because, in addition to the various Islamist groups, there are also numerous organizations of traffickers in drugs and other contraband. In this article, Jean Batou unravels the complexity of the situation to lay bare the central social struggles taking place. – Editors Looking back on events, it’s important to point out the real ins-and-outs of the French military intervention in Mali, launched officially on January 11 on the pretext of preventing a column of Salafist pick-up trucks from swooping down on the city of Mopti and the nearby Sévaré airport (640 km north of Bamako), and thus supposedly opening the way to Bamako, the capital and the country’s largest city. The emotions caused by the atrocities of various Islamist groups of North Mali gave this unilateral operation the allure of a humanitarian crusade supported by a large part of Malian, African, and international public opinion. Certainly the legal basis of support was weak given the illegitimacy of the government in Bamako, which—as we would learn later—had never asked for air support from France, but there was also the fact that the Malian army had been subordinated to the French, as well as the reluctance of the troops of the Economic Community of East African States (ECOWAS) to lend a hand. What then were the motives of this new French intervention in Franc Africa, whose neocolonial character stood out clearly, even if it arose in a particular local and international context? In order to understand such a complex phenomenon as the recurrent revolts of the Tuaregs of North Mali, as well as more recently the rise of political Islam and the role played by the armed Salafist groups in the region, it’s important to take some distance from the emotional reports of the corporate media that reduced each event to simply the immediate appearance, contributing to rendering it impossible to understand. I will begin therefore by describing the social situation in Mali, a country dominated by poverty, large areas facing famine, and the growth of social and regional inequalities arising in the context of economic liberalization, an opening to foreign capital under the pressure of a succession of structural adjustment programs that began in the late 1980s. Then I’ll turn to the history of Tuareg resistance to French colonialism, but also to the centralizing and repressive policies of independent Mali, without forgetting the longstanding resentment experienced by the black people there. Finally, I will attempt to analyze the specific role of certain actors, such as international investors who have encouraged the political rivalry of competing imperialist powers, the armed and mostly foreign Salafists and the traffickers (cigarettes, drug, arms, etc.) of Sahel. I conclude this overview by arguing in favor of the refusal to support the French military intervention. A Ravaged Country In 2011, the United Nations Development Program classified Mali in the 175th place of 187 countries in terms of human development. The most recent statistics indicate that women give birth to 6.5 living children, of whom six die before reaching the age of five years (half of those who survive suffer from retarded development). Death in childbirth affects one woman out of 200; nine out of ten homes have no electricity, 19 of 20 have no sewer system1; three quarters of those born in Mali who are more than seven years old do not attend school, etc. And when international institutions want to show some progress in the last decade, they still have to concede that there has been a continual increase in social inequality—and of regional inequality (the homes of Gao, Timbuktu, or Kidal, in the north, have less than half the income of those in Bamako)—and growth in the number of poor people. For the rural populations affected by recurring famines, the “lack of food” is today perceived as the number one problem. So last spring, some 13 to 15 million people of the Sahel—transition zone in northern Africa between the Sahara desert and the savannahs to the south—were facing hunger of whom 3.5 to 4 million were Malians.2 This is the remarkable situation of the descendants of a once great African empire of the Middle Ages called “Mali” by the Fulani people, a name meaning “to bring good luck.” Later, it’s true, its inhabitants experienced the brutal intensification of the slave trade that fed the Atlantic economies of the Europeans in the Americas as well as French colonization, both conducted by what can only be called terror methods. Vigné d'Octon, the nineteenth century anti-colonialist, has left this account of the taking of Sikasso (south-east of Bamako): “Everyone is captured or killed. All captives, about 4,000, herded along. [...] Each European received a woman of his choice [...] We are on our way back, some 40 kilometers, with the captives. Children and all those who are tired are killed with rifle butts and bayonets.”3 In these territories, death was ever present, and not just in the conquest. Death permeated the lives of the “natives,” who were dispossessed of their land, who suffered forced labor and corporal punishment, the rape of women, the reduction of food crops in favor of one-crop export products (cotton in Mali), a suffocating tax burden (which after 1908 had to be paid in cash) and innumerable humiliations. Franz Fanon drew this portrait: "The colonized, such as the people of the underdeveloped countries and like all the poor people of the world, see life not as a blossoming, not as the development of a vital seed, but as permanent struggle against an atmosphere of death. This death at point blank range is characterized by endemic famine, unemployment, morbidity and, inferiority complex and a lack of doors to the future. “4 After independence, largely controlled by the former colonial power which could count on the collaboration of a large part of the local elite,5 that heritage would lead to new famines such of those of the 1960s.6 From 1960 to1968, the Malian Modibo Keïta (recipient of the “Lenin Prize” in 1963) had used a developmentalist phraseology with a certain socialist flavor, advocating Pan-Africanism and non-alignment.7 He protested against French nuclear tests in the Sahara, succeeded in getting the French to close the bases at Kati, Gao, and Tessalit (1961), and gave support at an opportune moment to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). Nevertheless, he had not really succeeded in breaking with the neocolonial relationship. Samir Amin showed, some forty years ago, the limits of that experience which he at that time rather harshly called “a farce.”8 The bankruptcy of his policy, notably marked by the de facto return to la zone franc—the pegging of the Malian franc to the French franc—was followed, in November 1968, by a military coup d’état led by Moussa Traoré and the institution of a police dictatorship that would last 23 years. This situation was reversed in March 1991 following significant union and youth mobilizations (after January), the suppression of which left hundreds dead. This social movement led a dissident group in the army, headed by Amadou Toumani Touré, to taking power, which he quickly turned back over to a civilian government. Then Alpha Oumar Konaré, lifted up by popular protests to become head of state, decided to pursue a policy of reducing public expenditures, privatizing resources, and increasing export revenues. The foreign debt that Mali inherited from the dictatorship in effect permitted France, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank to impose on Bamako even more onerous regressive social structural adjustments, which are, called—in all seriousness—a framework for the fight against poverty.9 The bleeding white of Malian society explains the emigration of some four million of its citizens, principally to Africa, but also including some 120,000 who have gone to France. The Tuaregs: Between Geography and History The Tuaregs are a group of about two to three million people in the Sahara and on the borders of the Sahel.10 They live principally in the states of Niger and Mali, and to some extent in Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya. They speak a Berber language, Tamashek, and are similar to the people of North Africa before the Arab conquest. Their settlement, their poverty, their location in the poorest neighborhoods of the cities, but also their acculturation are general trends at the regional level, promoting the formation of an outbreak of revolt endemic in large areas that separate the Maghreb (Northwest Africa) from FrancAfrica, the French sphere of influence in Africa.11 In reality, the situation of the Tuaregs is consonant with the arbitrary political architecture of post-colonial Africa that laid out arbitrary “borderlines” between the various states. In Mali more specifically, it is extremely difficult to measure the demographic size of this people. According to the most credible sources, there are about 500,000 to 800,000 Tuaregs or approximately three to five percent of the total population of the country. In the three regions of the north, they represent however somewhere between one-third and one-half of the population of 1.5 million. However, unlike other inhabitants of this country, whose poorest people live in the countryside, it is the poorest among the Tuaregs who live in the cities, notably in Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, but also in Bamako. This particular circumstance could help to explain the growing influence among them of the Salafist political groups such as Ansar Dine—Defenders of the Faith—, who have used their considerable financial resources to take advantage of the resentments felt by the downwardly mobile Tuaregs. The history of the Tuaregs and of their relations with other African peoples precedes colonization by several centuries. They are reputed to have played a role in the capture, transport, and trade in black slaves destined for North Africa or the Middle East. Their “traditional” social organization, which was very hierarchical, included a “sub-caste” of enslaved black African origin—the Ikelan or Bella—dedicated to serving in the home, salt production or agriculture. These forms of domination have partially survived the colonial era,12 and even if they are not specific to the Tuaregs13—but also to other groups such as the Arabs, the Songhaïs and the Fulani—they are deeply resented by the black Malians. While a report by the humanitarian organization Tuareg Temedt (Tuareg Solidarity) stated that thousands of people were enslaved in the Gao region in 2008, this phenomenon is due at least as much to the impact of neoliberal policies—the growth of poverty, decline of public education and the presence of the central government, etc.—as it is to the survival of ancestral practices.14 The Reason for So Many Rebellions After the end of the 19th century, the Tuaregs offered a fierce resistance to French colonization. In January 1985 they inflicted a crushing defeat on Colonel Bonnier, who died outside Timbuktu with the rest of his officers, before Colonel Joffre could undertake his successful counter-offensive. Little by little the colonial power was able to occupy Azawad—North Mali— through a combination of bloody reprisals and the offering of privileges in order to co-opt tribal chiefs. The French authorities at the time considered the Tuaregs to be “white” people, superficially Islamized, and therefore likely to establish ties to the metropolis.15 In 1903, the colonial administration managed to conquer the principal tribal confederation, though it would take up the torch of rebellion again in the course of the First World War (1916-1917). This last general uprising would lead to a massacre. After that, all insubordination was cruelly repressed. In 1954, the colonial regime paraded the head of Alla ag Albacher, the inspirer of the resistance in Ifoghas mountains since 1923, through the streets of Boureissa to show what was in store for anyone who opposed the French authorities. Three years after independence, the Tuareg revolt raged again in 1963-1964, led by the tribes of Ifoghas. It was partly due to the increased taxation of livestock keepers, considered backward and idle by Bamako, but it also reflected the refusal of some of the Tuaregs to be led by blacks that they still perceived as their servants or slaves. It was brutally crushed by the state-builder Modibo Keïta who did not hesitate to command the bombardment of civilian populations in the mountains, the poisoning of their wells, the machine gunning of their livestock, and forcing their children to sing in Bambara, the West African language spoken by the majority of Malians. Hostilities broke out again from 1990 to 1995 (with an estimated 5,000 victims), leading to another wave of repression, but also to the explosion of inter-ethnic conflicts and the formation of self-defense militias among the other peoples of the Niger bend. Yet, this new eruption wasn’t comparable to that of the first half of the 1960s, since it involved many returning from Libya or Algeria, where they had gone in the 1970s or 1980s, pushed by famine, to look for work, or to fill the ranks of the Islamic Legion of Kadhafi (dissolved in 1987) as well as the Polisario Front. They called themselves the Ishumars (from the French word chômeur meaning unemployed). The musical group Tinariwen, recipient of a Grammy Award in the US in 2011 for Tassili, the best album in a foreign language, belongs to that generation in exile, which has largely broken with the traditional hierarchies. Upon returning home, some of these young, unemployed people were recruited and formed into mobile groups, equipped with 4 x 4 vehicles and armed with light weapons, to harass the symbolic and strategic sites (such as the uranium mines at Arlit) in the neighboring state of Niger. Yet, lacking any really ideological foundation or credible political project, they have not been able to surmount their differences. In 1996, they were convinced to turn over their arms in exchange for a rehabilitation plan for their fighters, the withdrawal of the Malian army from the non-urban zones of Azawad, and the appointment of some Tuaregs to positions in the national institutions, as a token of the recognition of the claims of their people. This policy coincided with a temporary end to the drought and a rise in the price of livestock. However, arguing that the agreement had not been respected, the Tuaregs revolted; the uprising raised its head again in 2006-2008, temporarily halted by an Algerian mediation effort. The rebellion coincided with a new exacerbation of social inequalities. Similar developments took place in Niger in 2007-2009, when four employees of the French Areva company were abducted (June 2008) and liberated a few weeks later. The matter concluded through the mediation of Libya, which was then closely allied with France… Hostilities broke out again in North Mali in January 2012, in the midst of a terrible drought, but, following the collapse of the Kadhafi regime, due to the influx of arms and mercenaries who had either fought for the dictator or with the revolutionary opposition) and who had passed through either Niger or Algeria.16 In the middle of that month, a group of Tuareg rebels, apparently linked to the future Ansar Dine Salafist movement (created later in April), summarily executed 80 police officers, soldiers, and civilians at Aguelhok (160 kilometers north of Kidal), with that giving the signal that there would be war without mercy. At the same time, nearly 400,000 people fled the devastating battles that affected the region. If the Tuareg fighters at first seem less divided amongst themselves than they were in the 1990s, with the building of the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), they soon had to deal with the competing formation of the Ansar Dine Salafist group, led by Iyad ag Ghali, one of the principal leaders of the uprising of the 1990s, who in the meantime had served as a Malian diplomat to Saudia Arabia. It should be considered that the relative portioning of these forces, but also the homogeneity of each of them, remains limited, as has been shown by succeeding quick changes in politics of the MNLA and the recent split in Ansar Dine. In addition, neither one of them represents a very large sector of the population. Coveted Natural Resources Foreign capital is more and more interested in Sub-Saharan Africa, which, far from being a sub-continent ignored by globalization, has experienced growing interests in the areas of agriculture, mining, and energy. In Mali, the Presidential Council for Investment (CPI), founded in 2003, is made up of representatives of numerous multinationals—Anglogold, Barclays, Coca-Cola, etc.—and the FMI and the World Bank also attend its meetings. Beyond that, the Malian Agency for Promotion of Investments (API), created in 2005, notes that the influx of foreign capital is encouraged without restrictions (and permits the repatriation of dividends and of proceeds from sales or liquidations). In terms of land, the API asserts that 2.4 million hectares of arable land—of 4.7 million —are available to investors,17 the great majority of whom are foreigners, notably for the production of biofuels, even though the overuse of land—including cotton plantations18—causes accelerated degradation and turns productive land into a desert.19 In the area of mining, subterranean Mali contains many more resources than have yet been exploited. Its production of gold made the fortune of South African Anglogold and put the country in the 16th place in gold production worldwide (2009). Yet, the working conditions are deplorable, in particular for the child laborers less than 15 years old, and the risks to the environment don’t in any case justify the economic benefits, which serve essentially to enrich the stockholders (20 percent of the capital is in Malian hands) and to service the foreign debt. The exploitation of other important mineral deposits—semi-precious stones, bauxite, uranium,20 etc.—is still in the realm of speculation. There are great hopes in the future extraction of petroleum in the north of the country, in particular in the Taoudeni basin21, but the drilling, mining, and transportation of hydrocarbons still pose technical, logistical, and financial complex problems, not to mention security issues. If French energy interests are linked to its military intervention in Mali, they are those of the Areva nuclear energy company which monopolizes the exploitation of the uranium deposits at Arlit in Niger (the world’s fourth largest producer), located 300 kilometers east of the border of the Malian region of Kidal. One will recall that a third of the fuel consumed by the French nuclear plants comes from this country. Moreover, Areva has just signed an agreement for the exploitation of the Imouraren basin (the second largest reserve in the world), 80 kilometers to the south of Arlit, 60 percent of the capital of which is the property of this company. A first tranche of investment of 1.2 billion euros has been already programmed. The French investors don’t at the moment hold the privileged positions in Mali that they do in other countries of FrancAfrica, one more reason today for claiming economic returns on military investments, beyond that of the international promotion of French war materiel. Yet, as the Survie Association notes, France has achieved a trade surplus on the order of 300 million euros with Mali, five times greater than its foreign aid to that country.22 Salafists and Dealers The situation on the ground is complicated by the growth in power of two types of actors who largely coincide as they dispute the Sahel region: 1) The “jihadists” mostly foreigners who have emerged from the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) of which a rival faction, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) is specifically interested in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2) There are dealers of all sorts, in particular those who deal in cocaine and heroin, and their local contacts. Clearly, the financial sources and the political relationships of these two types of actors are a great deal more important and more diverse than those of the Tuareg rebels. I. The rise of the Salafist armed groups of the Sahel is a result of their defeat in Algeria, but also of their weakening in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is reputed in the last few years to have established a new world center for terrorist activities in the African nations of the Sahel, from Sudan to Mauritania. It’s hard to measure the effective forces claimed by the AQMI which was formed after the denial of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) electoral victory by the Algerian Army, in 1992, which preceded the implacable repression of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a dissident faction of which escaped from the Algerian cul-de-sac and founded the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998; it became linked to international “jihadism” in the first half of the 2000s, before it took the name Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007. One would have to be pretty clever today to figure out how these groups from that exploded nebula function and how many armed troops they have, pulled as they are by the gravitational forces of hidden sponsors and also by the opportunities of lucrative traffic in hostage taking and ransom.23 It is, however, reasonable to distinguish these from political Islam following the Salafist line and with a certain popular base in the society, such as Ansar Dine in North Mali.24 The latter attempted to exploit to its advantage the endemic poverty, accentuated by shock treatments by the international financial institutions and implemented by the neocolonial authorities of Bamako. It thus expanded its audience with the goal of establishing a new regime based on its interpretation of Sharia law throughout the country.25 The United States has decided to increase its presence in Africa by invoking the threat of terrorism, establishing in the new African Command (Africom) in 2007. A diplomatic source revealed by Wikileaks, noted that the general headquarters should be based in Mali and that this would multiply the collaborative efforts—joint exercises, training managers, etc.—with African military forces, including those of Mali, within the framework of the “Saharan Partnership against terrorism.”26 So, on December 25, Obama announced a project for developing military cooperation with 35 African states, and on January 29, Niger revealed that it had accepted the establishment of a U.S. drone base. In reality, this beefed-up military presence is fundamentally intended to secure U.S. petroleum supplies (and other basic materials) shipped through the Gulf of Guinea, and to strengthen its position as it faces growing competition from China. II. The importance of drug trafficking today—not only cocaine and heroin but also pirate brand name cigarettes—as well as illegal immigration passing through the Sahel to North Africa and Europe remains the subject of conjecture, although it seems established that they have experienced an increase in recent years with the proven assistance of large areas of state and local military units. So, for example, in November 2009 an old Boeing 727 cargo plane—one of the few jets to have been able to land on a rapidly constructed airstrip—was discovered in the Malian desert, 200 kilometers north of Gao. Flying from South America, it had taken on cocaine for the French and Spanish markets, that had to be reached through Algeria and Morocco. The Salafist fighting groups finance themselves by taking hostages and through trafficking in various commodities, which provides them money for arms. It was in this way that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the presumed mastermind of the taking of the In Amenas hostages, Algeria, got the nickname “Mr. Marlboro.” This situation has led more than one observer—from Tariq Ramadan to the spokespeople for the French Army—to call into question the religious objectives of these groups. As for me, I don’t see why faith has to be opposed to profit and terror, though it is clear that popular Salafism is driven by other social dynamics than those nurturing al-Qaeda. This imbroglio has led recently to the rise of numerous conspiracy theories attempting to divine what’s behind the multiplication of armed Islamist groups in the Sahel, attributing it to one or another of the traffickers, to the interests of the United States, or even Germany, to the dream of an independent Sahelian emirate, rich in natural resources, separated from the FrancAfrican states of Mali and Niger. So it was in the name of the “lesser evil” presumed to be French domination of the entire region, that Samir Amin last January 23 surprisingly justified Operation Serval (or Operation African Wildcat), the French military action in Mali.27 It seems that France will play the role of the policeman of the European Union in the Sahel, continuing to carry out the work of preparing and training and reorganizing the armies of Mali and of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) that was decided last November at the instigation of France at a price of 12.5 million euros.28 What Does French Imperialism Want? One month after the opening of the French military intervention, its success seemed to be complete: the principal cities of the North had been taken and only one French soldier had been killed in combat (though a few more died since then). The scope of civilian losses and destruction on the ground remain hard to estimate given the media blackout imposed by France. The Salafist armed groups have evaporated, avoiding a frontal attack. The Malian officials have greeted the troops from the old colonial power as liberators, with undeniable popular support. The reprisals carried out by the Malian Army or by elements of the self-defense militia have failed to tarnish the French success, and not the least of the miracles is having conferred on François Hollande a stature of a real chief of state. According to Le Parisien, Operation Serval won the approval of 75 percent of those polled. This “dream scenario” has begun to fracture with the first military difficulties in the Massif of Ifoghas, the multiplication of attacks, and the kidnapping of French nationals in Cameroon. That said, the apparent success of the first phase of these operations poses a question: wasn’t there an overestimation of the firepower of the hardened and heavily armed troops who have fled before 2,000 French soldiers?29 How could France have the luxury of keeping the Malian Army completely out of the more sensitive conflicts, such as the taking of Kidal, which was captured without a struggle? How then can anyone believe that these Islamist groups were about to pounce on the center of the country before they had taken Bamako, the capital city with two million inhabitants who are violently hostile to them? Was the Malian army so unable to put up a fight against them? The Nouvel Observateur has revealed that, according to French intelligence sources, the Salafist fighters aimed at taking Mopti and its Sévaré Airport, while Captain Sanogo —the officer who staged a coup on March 22, 2012 — would profit by getting rid of interim president Dioncounda Traoré in Bamako. So that France, which had so far managed to cause problems for the putschists, notably through the pressures of ECOWAS, risked losing any credible political foothold in Mali. Its immediate response, prepared for in the field by Operation Sabre30 in September, would, on the other hand, give it time to work on site for a “democratic alternative,” duly sanctioned in good time by elections. It was only later learned that the Malian authorities had never asked for a ground engagement, but only for air support.31 Those who promised the French an Afghan quagmire, and praised the prudence of Washington and Berlin, went badly astray for the moment. On the other hand, the Malian and regional authorities—through the International Mission Support in Mali (MISMA), which involves seven countries of ECOWAS, but foremost Chad—will have to pay their debt in fighting the Salafist units that have retreated to the sands and mountains of Azawad. There are also constant comments on the upcoming installation of a French base in the center or north of the country: “It is not a coincidence,” noted one Senegalese commentator, “that the helicopter carrier Dixmude sailed from Toulon harbor to Dakar with a load as large as five TGV high-speed trains.”32 Such a base would be within easy reach of the uranium deposits of Arlit, and above all of Imuraren, that was won over at great cost by Areva at the expense of its Chinese competitors.33 It would complement the already existing bases of N’Djaména, Abéché (in Chad), and Djibouti on the Sahara-Sahelian frontier. At the same time, Paris will without doubt maintain a heavily armed intervention force in Bamako in order to assure a political transition on its terms against the restive sections of the Malian Army. It could also well be that it would provide a limited degree of autonomy for the Tuaregs, which would explain why special units assigned to occupy Kidal have kept the Malian Army away and why the DGSE (the French intelligence service), which is already in contact with the MNLA—“diplomacy” actively supported by Switzerland—has worked to split the Salafist Ansar Dine. It seems in effect that the spokesman of this group, Mohamed Ag Arib, for a long time an émigré residing in France and known to the French Foreign Affairs Ministry, has played a key role in setting in motion the new Azawad Islamic Movement (MIA). Will France be tempted to play the partition card in Mali, along the recent lines of Sudan, building on its privileged ties with key sectors of the Tuareg rebellion, a move it has been accused of by certain Malian political leaders? Nothing is less certain, insofar as it would put in danger the privileged links that it maintains with its principal neocolonial pawns in West Africa, beginning with Niger. Recall that the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (OCRS), established by the French Fourth Republic in January 1957, aimed to bring the territories of southern Algeria, northern Mali and Niger, and western Chad, potentially rich in oil, under French administration during the war in Algeria and in the context of African decolonialization.34 In 1958, De Gaulle attempted to make the OCRS his numberone priority, with the explicit support of the Socialist Party (then the SFIO). This plan failed, however, due to the resolute opposition of the Sudanese Union-African Democratic Coalition (US-RDA) of Modibo Keïta, supported by the principal Tuareg chiefs. If the Tuaregs were to drop some of the ballast of their claims for autonomy, they could be useful in putting pressure on the central government in Bamako, whose refusal to follow consistently the French line is a little out of place in the FrancAfrican landscape.35 From this point of view, sending UN peacekeepers to maintain peace between Bamako and the rebel movement of the North—the MLNA and the new MIA—could provide useful cover for France by leaving sufficient freedom of action—including military action—while giving the next Malian political leadership the veneer of international legitimacy. The French bourgeoisie won a significant battle in West Africa, at least for the moment, not only at the expense of its Western and Chinese competitors, but also of the peoples of the sub-region, who will now be exposed to a new stage of the neoliberal agenda that Paris and the European Union promote without reservations. The serval cat is certainly small, but is said to be able to urinate twenty times per hour to mark his territory. To cope with this increased activism of French imperialism in Africa, it is high time that the left and Malian, African, and international social movements stop thinking in “less-evilist” geopolitical terms and develop an internationalist perspective that takes as its starting point the dynamics of social struggles. The solution to the crisis begins with the Malian refusal of exploitation of the country by foreign capital, whether French, European, U.S., Chinese, Algerian or Qatari and its local cronies. It assumes the unity of its peoples to defend their sovereignty around a social and democratic program that does not overlook the right to self-determination.

#### **The drone is the key tool in the increasing War on Terror in Africa rooted in colonialism and racism, justified in “world stability.”**

Lévesque 12 (America’s Secret War in Africa Spreading drone warfare throughout AfricaJulie Lévesque is a journalist and researcher with the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal http://www.globalresearch.ca/americas-secret-war-in-africa/5307958 By [Julie Lévesque](http://www.globalresearch.ca/author/julie-l-vesque) Global Research, October 13, 2012) Dabo

The U.S. secret warfare is alive and well. In addition to its military command in Africa (AFRICOM), America has been deploying special forces all over the continent: “Small teams of special operations forces arrived at American embassies throughout North Africa in the months before militants launched the fiery attack that killed the U.S. ambassador in Libya. The soldiers’ mission: Set up a network that could quickly strike a terrorist target or rescue a hostage.”  (Kimberly Dozier, [White House widens covert ops presence in North Africa](http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2012/10/02/1208270?sac=fo.military), AP, October 2, 2012.) The U.S. is spreading its clandestine army all over Africa. As reported by Nile Bowie (Global Research, April 2012), the goal is to “balkanize” the African continent: “At an AFRICOM Conference held at Fort McNair on February 18, 2008, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller openly declared the guiding principle of AFRICOM is to protect “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market”, before citing China’s increasing presence in the region as challenging to American interests”. In 2007, US State Department advisor Dr. J. Peter Pham commented on AFRICOM’s strategic objectives of “protecting access to hydrocarbons and other strategic resources which Africa has in abundance, a task which includes ensuring against the vulnerability of those natural riches and ensuring that no other interested third parties, such as China, India, Japan, or Russia, obtain monopolies or preferential treatment.” (Nile Bowie, [COVERT OPS IN NIGERIA: Fertile Ground for US Sponsored Balkanization](http://www.globalresearch.ca/covert-ops-in-nigeria-fertile-ground-for-us-sponsored-balkanization/?print=1), Global Research, April 11, 2012.) The “War on Terror” fraud serves to cover up the destabilization of Africa with a view to taking control of its resources. The Balkans were destabilized for the same purpose in the 1990’s: In Liar’s Poker The Great Powers, Yugoslavia and the Wars of the Future, Michel Collon explains how the Balkans were destabilized “to control oil pipeline routes, dominate Eastern Europe as well as weaken and get a hand over Russia” as well as” insure [the establishment of US] military bases [in Eastern Europe and the Balkans].” (Michel Collon, [Liar’s Poker The Great Powers, Yugoslavia and the Wars of the Future](http://www.michelcollon.info/spip.php?page=produit&ref=POKER&lang=fr), Editions Aden, 1998, p. 129.) A similar process, over a large geographic region, is occurring in the Middle East:“Syria, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement for a gas pipeline in July 2011, which plans to link the Iranian South Pars field – the world’s largest – to Syria and therefore to the Mediterranean Sea. Another important oil field was discovered near Homs in Syria, which could become an alternative hub of energy corridors in opposition to those passing through Turkey and other routes controlled by U.S. and European companies” (Manlio Dinucci, [L’art de la guerre. Syrie : l’Otan vise le gazoduc](http://www.mondialisation.ca/lart-de-la-guerre-syrie-lotan-vise-le-gazoduc/), October 9, 2012) America’s clandestine army will resort to drone warfare to assert control over the African resources. Although the U.S. and its allies have financially and materially supported Al-Qaida-linked mercenaries to topple the Libyan government and are operating in the same fashion in Syria, we are told that the “counter terror effort indicates that the administration has been worried for some time about a growing threat posed by Al Qaeda and its offshoots in North Africa.” (Dozier, op.cit.) Although the Pentagon assures that “[t]here are no plans at this stage for unilateral U.S. military operations”, the article states quite to the contrary that a unilateral drone warfare is what awaits Africans: Delta Force group will form the backbone of a military task force responsible for combating al-Qaida and other terrorist groups across the region with an arsenal that includes drones. But first, it will work to win acceptance by helping North African nations build their own special operations and counter terror units. (Ibid.) The hypocritical discourse that follows indicates in which African states the “free flow of natural resources to the global market” and “access to hydrocarbons and other strategic resources” will be protected under the “War on Terror” pretext: The Obama administration has been concerned about the growing power and influence of al-Qaida offshoots in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and North Africa. Only the Yemeni branch has tried to attack American territory directly so far, with a series of thwarted bomb plots aimed at U.S.-bound aircraft. A Navy SEAL task force set up in 2009 has used a combination of raids and drone strikes to fight militants in Yemen and Somalia, working together with the CIA and local forces. The new task force would work in much the same way to combat al-Qaida’s North African affiliates, which are growing in numbers and are awash in weapons from post-revolutionary Libya’s looted stockpiles. They are well-funded by a criminal network trafficking in drugs and hostages. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM, and Nigerian-based extremist sect Boko Haram are arguably the two largest and most dangerous affiliates. The top State Department official for African affairs said Tuesday that the militants in Mali “must be dealt with through security and military means.” (Ibid.) And even though we are told there are “no plans at this stage for unilateral U.S. military operations”, Johnnie Carson, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs seems to contradict this claim by saying “any military action up there must indeed be well planned, well organized, well resourced and well thought through” and, how thoughtful, “be agreed upon by those who are going to be most affected by it.” (Ibid.)

#### Ending the drone war is a key step to ending extreme racism

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(Edwin, Budding activist interested in economic and social justice, environmental issues, and foreign policy, “MLK On The Racist Drone Wars”, <http://edwisdom.com/2013/08/racist-drone-wars/>, rcheek)

A few weeks ago, Obama launched a series of drone strikes on Yemen. Today is the 50th anniversary of the March on Washington, where MLK gave his “I Have a Dream” speech. How are these two events related?¶ Well, it seems like everybody loves offering lip service to MLK’s ideas, without fully understanding the truly radical ideas he held. Civil rights was just one of many things he fought for. Perhaps we can understand what King railed against in his day from his comment that we must “redeem the soul of America from the triple evils of racism, war and poverty.” The drone war is an issue that’s representative of ALL 3 evils that MLK spoke of. I’ll go through them here briefly.¶ Military Aggression and War¶ This is probably the most obvious “evil” that the drone war represents. I’ve already documented how the drone war is illegal, inaccurate, and morally obscene. That bombing innocent people in other countries is an act of war is not really in doubt. A fierce critic of the Vietnam War, it’s impossible MLK would’ve approved of this war, where people are killed without charge or trial just because of their religion.¶ Economic Exploitation and Poverty¶ This one’s a bit more complex, but just as relevant. As we engage in an endless global war, more and more resources will be funneled into finding creative ways to kill people. That means taxpayer money’s going to large defense companies, which is why I’ve called military spending a “Rigged Institution.” It’s shameful we spend over $600 billion on our military, while 20% of children go hungry in the richest nation in the history of the world.¶ Racism¶ This is the most interesting and revealing “evil.” So how is the drone war racist? Gallup recently took a great poll of American citizens, and the results are worth reading into. A majority, 65% support the use of drones abroad against suspected terrorists. But, if it’s a US citizen abroad, the support drops to 41%. If it’s a US citizen on US soil, the number becomes just 13%. The implications are simple. American people have basic rights to, you know, not get killed while they’re walking to the store. But foreigners, eh. If you’re not an American citizen, your rights don’t matter all that much.¶ And if security is what we’re worried about, then why are people opposed to using drones on US soil, where terrorists are even more of a threat? I know what people are thinking. What if innocent people around the target die? It’s OK to kill those innocent civilians back in Yemen, but not here. No, no, every American life is precious.¶ It’s exactly this kind of racism, this kind of “our lives are worth more than yours” mentality that MLK despised and fought against. As he pointed out, the triple evils are all interrelated. The secret drone war, in which innocent people are murdered because of the color of their skin, must be ended if our support of MLK and the civil rights movement’s ideals is not a farce. I, and the people of the Middle East, hope it isn’t

You have an obligation to reject any racism in every instance. Rejecting racism is an a priori issue that justifies all forms of violence
Memmi 2000 (Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.\

#### Racism cannot merely be rejected or it will be coopted by the oppressors. Actively acting against racism is key

Memmi 2000(Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris, Albert, “RACISM”, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.156-157)

To refuse racism is to choose a certain conception of humanity; it means a reconciliation among different constituent groups, thus a relative unification, not of all in each other but of each in relation to the others. Conversely, humanity cannot unify itself in this relative way except through intergroup equality, and equality between individuals who compose each group. Ordinarily, this is what would be called universalism. Two principal objections have been made to universalism. The first is that it is ineffective and even hypocritical as a philosophy. The second, which flows from the first, is that it is obsolete, like an old horse put out to pasture not for having been used up but for having demonstrated its inherent and tragic uselessness. The Jewish universalism of its prophets, the Christian universalism of its churches, the Islamic universalism of its indulgent community of believers, of people of the book, the Marxist universalism of proletarian unity through which the eventual wellbeing of all by means of the Revolution is projected have none of them succeed in putting an end to violence, to injustice, or to massacre. At best, up to now, a universalism has remained utopia. Or worse, it has served as an alibi for distracting attention from existent and always recurring privilege. For the dominated, universalism has always been a false philosophy that has served to cover their real oppression with a cloak of abstract virtue. This was true in the slave trade, the industrialization of Europe, and the building of colonial empires. To claim that men are brothers while holding some of them in slavery is to be complicit in the crime. Is universalism possible that would not be either a trap or a utopia? Paradoxically, instead of renouncing it, what is needed is more universalism, that is, the passage from an abstract to concrete universalism. It is not sufficient simply to condemn racism; it is necessary to act on the collective social conditions of its existence. In effect, universalism must pass from being just a philosophy to becoming an activity. A double activity, actually, both negative and positive; a struggle against oppression and a struggle for effective and reciprocal fraternity. In the last analysis, because racism is a direct or indirect manifestation of dominance it becomes possible if only one has the means to dominate another under the guise of an opinion. The practical implication is that to push back racism, one must combat all forms of domination.

#### Racism creates biopolitical control that makes war inevitable

Mendieta 02, Eduardo Mendieta, PhD and Associate professor of Stonybrook School of Philosophy, “‘To make live and to let die’ –Foucault on Racism Meeting of the Foucault Circle, APA Central Division Meeting” http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty\_pages/docs/foucault.pdf

This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same8 political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes **and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture.** As I wrote somewhere else, **racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other**, of others, **an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies**. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.